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William David Ross was born in Thurso, Scotland on 15 April 1877. He died in Oxford on 25 May 1971. In 1895, he received first-class honours in classics from the University of Edinburgh. He then entered Oxford University, where he obtained first-class honours in classical honour moderations and in the literae humaniores. In 1902, he became tutor and Fellow at Oriel College and, in 1929, its Provost. He went on to play many important administrative roles in Oxford. In addition, he distinguished himself in public service, and was knighted in 1938. His work in ancient philosophy produced significant translations and interpretations of Aristotle. He wrote two books in ethics, The Right and the Good (1930) and Foundations of Ethics (1939), in which he articulated formidable challenges to ideal utilitarianism and a rich form of pluralistic deontology.
	Ideal utilitarians believe that an agent acts rightly in so far as her action produces at least as much net good as any other action she could have performed in her situation. Ross agrees with this view that there is a plurality of goods; his list of goods comprises virtue, pleasure, justice, and knowledge (Ross, 1930, pp.134-141; cf. 1939, pp.252-289). He disagrees with ideal utilitarianism’s monism about moral requirement. Instead, there is a plurality of prima facie, not absolute obligations, including obligations of promise keeping, reparation, gratitude, beneficence, and non-maleficence (Ross, 1930, pp.24-27). Each specifies a factor that matters to the morality of an action. What we ought to do, all things considered, is determined by reliance on these factors. We are certain that we have these prima facie obligations, though we can never be certain of our obligations sans phrase (pp.20, 30). About the latter we have merely “probable opinion” (p.33). Ross holds that the views of the “plain man” or of “thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics” (pp.20-21n, 41). These are instances of knowledge. The philosopher’s job is not to prove or disprove them; rather, her job is to be loyal to them (pp.20-21n, 23). In Ross’s mind, conflict with common-sense morality spells doom for a theory of ethics. His own view, he suggests, is closest to that of the plain man. 
	Ross maintains that to its discredit ideal utilitarianism delivers verdicts that conflict with common sense. He thinks this is clearest in the case of the obligation to keep one’s promises. His initial argument runs as follows (pp.34-35). Ted has promised Ed that he will help him harvest his crops, producing 1,000 units of surplus good. Ted subsequently realizes that he can assist Belinda with her harvest, thereby producing 1,001 units of surplus good, though he has not promised Belinda. Ideal utilitarianism says Ted ought to break his promise. This is not, however, the view of common sense. The ideal utilitarian has a reply (pp.37-38). If you consider not only the immediate but also the long term costs and benefits of the two actions, it is wrong on ideal utilitarian grounds to break the promise. Promise-breaking erodes general mutual confidence and promise-keeping strengthens it. Once this is factored in, the balance of good is on the side of keeping the promise. Ross thinks this reply will not do: there are cases in which even when all of the costs and benefits are factored in the benefits of breaking a promise will only slightly outweigh the benefits of keeping it (p.38). In this case, ideal utilitarianism says break the promise and thus will be at odds with common sense. Common sense says that only a much greater benefit will justify breaking a promise (p.35). 
	Ross does hold that the production of some good is a necessary condition of the rightness of keeping a promise. He claims that “whereas we are certain that keeping a promise is prima facie right, we are not certain that it is prima facie optimific (though we are perhaps certain that it is prima facie bonific)” (p.36), and that “when we consider ourselves bound, for instance, to fulfill a promise, we think of the fulfillment of the promise as the bringing into existence of some source of pleasure or satisfaction for the person to whom we have made the promise” (p.162). Oliver Johnson argues that this conflicts with common sense. Suppose that “A (who believes that the human soul is not immortal) is at the bedside of his friend B, who is dying. Before his death B asks A to arrange for the cremation, rather than the burial, of his body. A promises to do so and B dies. Does A have any moral obligation to fulfill his promise to B?” (Johnson, 1959, p.38) Johnson says that it is clear that A is obliged to B, but that Ross cannot account for this: the fulfilment of the promise produces none of Ross’s goods. Johnson’s ideal utilitarianism can explain why A is obligated to B, since it posits that promise keeping is non-instrumentally good (Johnson, 1953, p. 606; 1959, pp.137ff.). 
	Ross has several replies. First, Ross might argue that in the case that Johnson discusses there is a good at issue, the satisfaction of B’s interest. The difficulty with this reply is that Ross needs to establish that it is more plausible to hold that interests are good than that, like Johnson, promise-keeping is good or that promise-breaking is bad. He may have to rely on controversial claims, such as that only states of mind are good (Ross, 1930, p.140). Perhaps his best bet is to argue that it is more likely that the morality of a promise is affected by the interest that it is intended to fulfill than that it is affected by being part of a way of life that “is fitting or appropriate for human beings” (Johnson, 1959, p.139). 
	A second reply is that Ross might argue that it is a necessary condition that the promise benefit the promisee rather than that it produce some good. This, again, allows him to argue that A ought to keep the promise to B, for the fulfilment of the promise satisfies B’s interest and therefore benefits him. In this case, he need not argue that the interest is non-instrumentally good. A third reply is that he might drop the claim that the production of some good is a necessary condition of the rightness of keeping a promise. This allows him to argue that in the above case it is right to keep the promise to B. It seems that he loses nothing by making this move, and he gains by being closer to the views of the plain man. 
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